From federalism to neo-federalism in East Africa by Rothchild, Donald
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribuiion-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.0rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 

Donald Rothchild 2 
From Federalism to Neo-Federalism 
in East Africa' 
University of East Africa Social 
Science Conference, December 1966 
PS1-1 
From Federalism to Neo-Federalism in East Africa * 
"by Donald Rothchild 
University College, and University of California, 
Nairobi Davis 
"A Federation of at least Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika should 
be comparatively easy to achieve," Tanganyika's President Julius K. 
Nyerere wrote in March 1963. "We already have a common market, 
and run many services through the Common Services Organization --
which has its own Central Legislative Assembly and an executive 
composed of the Prime Ministers of the three states. This is the 
nucleus from which a Federation is the natural growth."1 
Within a year, however, it had become apparent that an East 
African federation would not be comparatively easy to establish. 
Despite a broad aspiration for African unity, experience following 
decolonization shattered hopes of an easy movement toward regional 
unification. A sense of national belongingness and national interest 
emerged rapidly after uhuru. The effects of this outgrowth of 
national consciousness upon region-building were great indeed. So 
much energy became consumed by the demands of nation-buildihg that 
little remained for such less immediate goals as political federation. 
Borders hardened to some extent into barriers and the fluidity of the 
colonial period passed. In East Africa, as in West Africa before it, 
federations proved difficult to construct and harder still to maintain. 
Nevertheless, because federation is a response to genuine needs, 
it seems certain that the desire to found transnational unions will 
persist in the years to come. Economic inducements such as regional 
comparative advantage and economies of scale as well as expanded 
opportunities for interterritorial projects (electric power and 
irrigation systems), a wider financial base, and a more rational 
allocation of skilled technicians and managerial personnel are 
constants— even if the benefits apply unequally to prospective parxners. c. 
Moreover, it is necessary to broaden the balance sheet by 
mentioning the wide gamut of non-economic advantages such as 
increased aid and investment appeal, international influence and 
leverage, and enhanced military capability. These inducements, 
even if sometimes more potential than actual, are not likely to 
disappear with the passage of time; instead, success with 
industrialization and the mechanization of agriculture as well as 
increasing involvement in world politics will make national autarchy 
more and more impossible to effect. Clearly the federation issue 
is not dead. Since closer unity is a logical response to the needs 
of long-term stability and development, it is likely to be a 
recurrent field for inquiry and experimentation among the modernizing 
countries„ 
* Parts of this essay are adapted from my article, "The Limits of 
Federalism? An Examination of Political Institutional Transfer 
in Africa," which will appear in the Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol.4, No. 3. 
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An -examination of region-building in Africa is important not 
only as a case study of supranational activity but also as an 
analysis of the relationship between political action and constitu-
tionalism. Federation is seen as an essentially political problem, 
a bargaining situation involving a legitimate play of interests — 
territorial and interterritorial. As such, the main political 
participants in the dialogue can advance perfectly logical and 
rational reasons for joining or not joining a wide geographical 
union. At heart, however, political motives are viewed as most 
central in the decision-making process. Perhaps, then, the 
federation issue is of the very essence of the human condition. 
Widespread agreement exists in principle on the benefits of trans-
national unity; yet men seem to be gripped by immobilisme, frequently 
placing the highest priorities on short-term objectives. 
If men fear the unknown and shrink from commitments on a broad 
scale, logic requires that political analysis search out a variety 
of alternatives which will reduce integration load factor. It is 
possible that the plunge into unity can be made less awesome in this 
manner. Surely where classical federalism fails to satisfy 
Africa's requirements of stability and development, the investigation 
of new forms of statecraft is essentialo Here is where the political 
scientists have been lacking in foresight and ingenuity. They have 
moved behind the events of Africa, offering little insight into the 
variety of institutional arrangements available for experimentation. 
This study seeks to examine both the limited utility of 
classical federalism under African conditions and the nature of the 
attempt to innovate and form novel institutional structures. It 
will show the movement from federalism to neo-federalism not as a 
failure of will and purpose but as a logical adaptation to the 
political conditions and pressures of the post-colonial era. Neo-
federalism represents the triumph of ingenuity and responsibleness, 
not the reverse. 
How might regional unification to be brought about in Africa? 
Although "federation" seemed to imply a formula for achieving 
integration, it actually proved to be not one but many designs. 
Recognition of the existence in East Africa of strikingly different 
conceptions of what federation comprises is crucial to an under-
standing of the breakdown of negotiations on unity in that region 
during 1963 and 1964. As Colin Leys observes: "what Tanganyika 
wanted, what the Kenyans were willing and able to agree, and what 
most people in those countries understood, was not federal government, 
but unification."3 For the Tanganyikans and Eenyans, regional 
unity involved "the concept of a tightly constructed federation'^. 
In fact, Tanganyikans were willing to endure the adverse short-term 
implications of the existing common market arrangment because they 
assumed that a "close political federation" would reallocate 
developmental opportunities to the poorer areas. 5 But for the 
Ugandans, federation inferred a loose plan of interterritorial 
coordination. Throughout the negotiations on East African unity, 
Uganda's representatives strove to limit central authority in such 
fields as foreign affairs, citizenship, external borrowing, 
agriculture and animal husbandry, higher education, mines, and 
trade unions. Thus a fundamental divergence existed in conceptions 
about the nature of federation; these divergencies contributed 
substantially to the final collapse of the working party deliber-
ations, for they proved too basic to make compromise feasible. 
It should be clear at the outset that if one or more 
prospective partners conceived of federation in loose structural 
terms, amalgamation along unitary lines was out of the question — 
unless its advocates resorted to coercive manipulation to achieve 
their ends.6 In fact, territorial consciousness developed 
quickly with independence, leaving all too few nationalists who 
could espouse President Nyerere's 1962 sentiment expressed in the 
rhetorical comment: "what is Tanganyika after all — East Africa 
makes more sense."7 Territorial consciousness combined with a keen 
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understanding and fear of the strength implicit in a transnational 
unitary government precluded the adoption of a highly centralized 
polity. Possible schemes of administrative decentralization within 
a unitary system were not deemed by all to be sufficient safeguards 
of territorial interests. Since unitary government implied 
ultimate central superiority, it was not surprising to find some 
territorial nationalists resisting subordination and demanding a 
division of competences which guaranteed a limited but effective 
autonomy. 
Unquestionably unitary government had wide appeal among East 
Africa's opinion formers. In a positive sense, unitary structures 
were praised for enhancing swift decision-making, facilitating 
administration, and contributing to nation-building; in a negative 
sense, such structures were regarded favorably because of their 
ability to avoid waste, duplication and overlapping responsibilities. 
In Kenya, members of the Kenya African National Union rejected 
majimbo ( subregionalism), arguing that it created "conflicting 
pockets of power;M8 in Uganda, Dr. Obote and his colleagues viewed 
Buganda's federal relationship with the center under the 1962 
constitution as an impediment to unity. When introducing the April 
1966 Constitution, Obote made a point of terminating Buganda's 
entrenched powers under the former basic law and creating a unitary 
system of government in his country.9 Ironically, the same Dr. 
Obote who was an ardent exponent of unitary government at the 
territorial level in 1966 had been an equallyardent proponent of a 
loose federal system at the supranational level during the 1963/64 
deliberations I In acting in this manner, he was consistent in 
upholding what he saw as Uganda's national interest against the twin 
forces of Buganda separatism and overcentralization in an East 
African context. 
Even though evoking wide appeal, unitary government was 
inapplicable to East Africa's circumstances because it lacked the 
capacity to reconcile the area's stubborn diversities. But could 
federalism act as a satisfactory alternative? By dividing the power 
of the state between governments coordinate in nature,10 could 
federalism provide a workable balancing mechanism between the polar 
extremes of centralism and separatism? For federalism to be 
applicable in a given situation, the following five conditions are 
required; 
(1) an adequate, geographically-based diffusion of power; 
(2) an ethos favorable toward federalism; 
(3) a climate of political tolerance; 
(4) a sense of community; 
(5) a myth of potential benefit. 
Since some African spokesmen looked to federalism as a means 
of ensuring economic viability while safeguarding subregional or 
tribal interests, an adequate, geographically-based diffusion of 
power became a prerequisite to the maintenance of a lasting 
equilibrium. Such a tensional type of federalism virtually 
precluded two-unit arrangements, for the security of subregional 
interests lay in the fluidity of diverse and overlapping relationships. 
As James Madison observed in his call for federation following the 
American wa.r of independences "Extend the sphere and you take in a 
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable 
that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the 
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will 
be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, 
and to act in unison with each other. "11 In Af-rica as in the 
United States, enlarging the size of the state, with a resultant 
increase in social diversity, appealed to many as a means of 
spreading political power, thereby inhibiting the advent of majorit-
arian tyranny. 
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If two-unit federal schemes have been the easiest to negotiate, 
they have also proved the most difficult to maintain in any kind of 
equilibrium. The momentum of politics in the post-decolonization 
era has revealed centripetal forces which have either succeeded in 
overwhelming regional authorities or succumbed to them. The first 
pattern (Uganda-Buganda 12 and Ethiopia-Eritrea relations) led to 
unitary government; the second pattern, exemplified by the Mali 
Federation, led to the split up of the supranational arrangement. In 
either case what was demonstrated was the fragility of federal 
arrangements when superimposed on situations where an inadequate 
diffusion of political power took place on an areal basis.13 
In East Africa, the inability of federalism to thwart a central 
leadership determined to gain hegemony was evident in Uganda. Prior 
to independence, Baganda leaders sought to gain ironclad safeguards 
for their nation within the larger state. They were keenly aware 
of the inability of subrogional guarantees to protect the Ashanti, 
their counterparts in Ghana, and insisted, prior to ending talk of 
secession, upon a. full federal relationship between their kingdom 
and the central government. A. Milton Obote, the leader of the 
Opposition in parliament at that time, recognized the need to work 
out an accommodation with the politically powerful Baganda and, at 
the London conference in 1961, accepted Buganda's key demands — 
federal status and indirect Lukiiko election of its representatives 
to the Rational Assembly. Dbote's diplomatic coup brought his 
Uganda People's Congress (UPC) to power in alliance with Buganda-
based Kabaka Yekka (KY). Such an alliance of diverse — even 
antagonistic — interests could only endure as long as each political 
party lacked the strength to rule alone. 
At the outset, the constitutional and political arrangement 
seemed to augur well for Baganda interests. Unlike the Ashanti, 
who were politically divided and held somewhat flexible attitudes 
toward innovation and modernization, the Baganda were united, 
progressive, and strategically located in the heartland of their 
country.14 Yet even these initial advantages proved incapable of 
preventing the Obote administration from gaining the upper hand. In 
the constitutional sphere, Obote was able to take advantage of his 
wide discretion under the basic law to refuse to transfer such 
services as forestry and police to Buganda authorities. Moreover, 
conflicts over juridical and fiscal relations were generally resolved 
in favor of the central government. In the political sphere, the 
attraction of being on the government side led to a series of 
defections from the ranks of KY and the Democratic Party which 
significantly altered the balance of power in the National Assembly. 
By 1964, the UPC had drawn sufficient support from its two 
opponents to oust KY from the cabinet and rule on its own. With KY 
leaders and supporters joining the UPC in significant numbers as well 
as locked in internal party conflict among themselves, Buganda unity 
was gravely weakened and the kingdom was left exposed to new pressures 
in the constitutional sphere. The final showdown came in 1966 when 
Obote seized power and suspended the 1962 constitution ''to ensure 
stability, unity and order in the country."15 On April 15, 1966, 
parliament adopted a new constitution which abrogated Buganda's 
entrenched privileges under the 1962 basic law and treated the 
country as a unitary state. As Obote bluntly told the members of 
parliament: "there is no federation and there is going to be no 
federation."16 The Buganda Lukiiko bitterly criticized the new 
constitution, and, on May 20, passed a resolution calling on the 
central government to leave Buganda soil within ten days time. 
This ultimatum, which was signed by Sir Edward Mutesa, was followed 
by arrests, disturbances, and, finally, the storming of the Kabaka's 
palace. Buganda's second secession attempt had failed, confirming, 
for the moment at least, the unitary nature of Uganda's constitutional 
system.17 
If Uganda's experience suggests the difficulty of applying 
federalism in situations where only one powerful ethnic group 
possessed meaningful autonomy within the system, the Mali experience 
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indicates the fissiparous strains of territorial nationalism upon a 
two—unit faderation. As originally conceived, the Mali Federation 
was to consist of the four territories of the Soudan, Senegal, 
Dahomey, and Upper Volta. However combined pressure from France's 
de Gaulle and the Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny caused the two 
weaker members to withdraw. What was left was a rump federation of 
two dissimilar neighbors, the Soudan and Senegal, — unlike in their 
ideologies, attachment to French culture, economic priorities, and 
nature of party mobilization and control. Soudanese and Senegalese 
leaders strove realistically to play down the impact of these 
differences by providing in their joint constitution for equal 
territorial representation in the federal Assembly. In practice, 
moreover, equality of membership on the federal Council of Ministers 
was accepted policy, and a balance of interests was implicit in the 
choice of Soudan's Modibo Keita as Premier and Senegal's Mamadou Dia 
as Vice-President and Minister of Defense. Nevertheless, such 
concessions to territorial interests were of limited utility. As 
William Foltz notess 
While such an emphasis on representational parity 
could go far to allay fears of either side's being 
systematically exploited by the other, it also 
could decrease the federal government's flexibility 
of action.... Equally serious, if a repeated pattern 
of unilateral defection from territorial solidarity 
developed, one side could enjoy a permanent majority 
on all issues. 18 
That this reduction in the load factors of integration was too 
limited in the circumstances of a two-unit federation soon became 
evident. In 1960, Senegalese leaders insisted that the parity 
principle be applied in working out the division of executive posts 
after independence. When the more radical and centralist-minded 
Soudanese refused to support Leopold Senghor's bid for the federal 
presidency and thereby failed to allay Senegalese suspicions and 
anxieties regarding their role in the future federation, Senghor and 
Mamadou Dia organized a military coup which successfully split the 
federation into two separate parts. The first strains of independ-
ence had been sufficient to undo the weak and unproved links between 
these two West African territories. 
Federation is poorly adapted to situations where two power 
centers are in conflict with one another; however, is it more likely 
to endure if applied to an area which includes three or more major 
subregional or territorial groups? To be sure, the greater the 
number of powerful groups comprising the union, the greater the 
difficulty involved in negotiating the federal agreement. Neverthe-
less overcoming this difficulty of negotiation may be the price of 
avoiding a structural instability which tends toward the extremes 
of centralization or separation. 
The diffusion of power along federal lines among three or more 
constituent units has been attempted in Nigeria and planned in East 
Africa. The Nigerian and proposed East African experiments seemed, 
at the outset at least, to be propitious. So long as tribal units 
could act successfully as centers of countervailing power, 19 
Nigeria's federalism, with its four, powerfully-based regional 
governments, seemed to offer favorable circumstances for the 
maintenance of political pluralism. Nigeria's extensive social 
diversity and vigorous party competition buttressed this formal 
spreading of power, laying the foundation for an enduring dispersion 
of authority within a single state structure. The growth of 
economic and social interdependence, moreover, appeared to augur 
well for the political stability of the new state. 
And if the territorial units could be utilized as centers of 
countervailing power, East Africa, with its long history of 
administrative coordination, possessed objective conditions for unity 
as favorable as any in the third world. Certainly social, cultural, 
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political and economic differences existed at the time of the June 5 
declaration on federation, but they were small compared to those 
elsewhere. Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda formed a contiguous land mass 
area, had been ruled by the same metropolitan power, and had emerged 
from colonial rule at roughly similar times. Their leaders shared 
common educational backgrounds anda commoni pan-Africanist ideology; 
moreover their experiences together in operating a joint customs 
union, common currency and tariff arrangement, and such inter-
territorial services as railways, posts and harbors, and airways 
created links which made its proponents optimistic about the chance 
for unity. There was little reason to doubt the territorial units' 
capacity to offer effective resistance to an overweening center, 
making a hopeful enterprise of East Africa's supranational experiment 
with federalism. 
In practice, however, multidimensional federalism has thus far 
failed to materialize in Africa since its advocates have been unable 
to make a stable and creative adjustment between constituent units, 
whether tribal or territorial. During January 1966, Nigeria's 
military abruptly seized power and scuttled the federal system in 
the process. Corruption, the Western Region crisis,the treason 
trials, and the trade union strikes have all contributed substantially 
to the decline of federalism. Upon seizing power, Major-General 
Aguiyi-Ironsi issued a decree making the regional military governments 
responsible to the central military government under his commandj he 
immediately showed his determination to establish a unitary system 
of government by appointing Francis Nwokedi as Commissiorer on" Special 
Duties, charged with establishing an administrative machinery for a 
united Nigeria.20 In summary, then, Nigeria's ethnic-based, multi-
dimensional political pluralism may have propped up federal 
institutions for a longer period than did the more limited pluralism 
of Ghana or Uganda, but in time even Nigeria's social diversity 
proved incapable of sustaining a viable federalism. 
If Nigeria's ethnic loyalties complicated the task of bringing 
about a significant degree of linkage among regional and central 
political leaders, East Africa's territorial loyalties proved at 
least as difficult to combine into a common polity... The accession 
of all three countries to separate, sovereign independence, as 
President Julius Nyerere prophesied in advance of the event,21 
created internal political and economic pressures which were 
dysfunctional to regional integration. Nation-building as well as 
economic planning and development were soon accorded a higher priority 
than supranationalism, a tendency reinforced in the political sphere 
by the growth of vested interests and the decline of elite linkage.22 
Consequently, even if a three-unit 23 East African federation went 
far toward satisfying the first requirement of an adequate, 
geographically-based diffusion of power, it has failed, much as has 
multidimensional Nigeria, to find a sufficient countrywide consensus 
to keep these groups in a stable relationship. Under such 
circumstances, it does not come as a surprise to find both Nigeria 
and East Africa pursuing essentially similar alternatives, namely 
searching for new transnational arrangements which are looser than 
classical federalism in their construction. In doing this, they 
are fully cognizant of the prevailing lack of consensus and they 
are moving to reduce integration load factors in an effort to 
preserve the most crucial benefits of inter-unit coordination. 
The second test of applicability — an ethos favorable to 
federalism — showed such a system to be lacking in appeal in many 
quarters. As already indicated, a number of important East 
Africans, when thinking of federalism, conceived of a highly 
centralized polity. East African negotiations on unity consequently 
floundered, for federalist-oriented Uganda refused to surrender 
powers to a tightly-constructed supranational state system. 
In addition to this basic divergence of conceptions of the 
nature of federalism is the attitude of elite groups toward this 
form of statecraft. Quite clearly, federalism evokes little 
enthusiasm in Africa as a whole and, as might be anticipated, has 
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lass appeal for the ideologue than for the pragmatist. Its. overlaps, 
duplications, compromises, excessive legalism, and lack of symmetry 
offends the ideologically-oriented person,who seems almost 
instinctively to recoil from proposals for federalism, except, perhaps, 
at the pan-African level. The outstanding example of this viewpoint 
is Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who provoked the ire of East African leaders 
with his statement that, 
In effect, regional federations are a form of 
balkanization on a grand scale. These may give 
rise to the dangerous interplay not only of power 
politics among African States and the regions, 
but can also create conditions which will enable 
the imperialists and neo-colonialists to fish in 
such troubled waters.24 
Nkrumah's avowed hostility to federalism stemmed in large measure from 
his bitter battle against Ashanti subregionalist aspirations at the 
time of Ghana's independence. He successfully headed off attempts 
to place subregionalist restraints upon his own authority and then 
went on to raise grave doubts about the utility of federalism else-
where, Thus he advised Patrice Lumumba against the use of federalism 
in the Congo, arguing that it inhibited economic development and was 
tainted with "tribalism" and "neo-colonialism," "...Just at a time 
when a strong government is necessary," he argued pragmatically in 
support of his general ideological position, "federalism introduces 
an element of paralysis into the machinery of State, and slows down 
the process of governmental action...."25« For Nkrumah, such a 
loose form of polity as federalism could be justified only at the 
pan-Africanist level. 
The ideologues explicit rejection of federalism might have been 
expected| what did occasion surprise, however, was the pragmatists' 
lack of enthusiasm for such a system. One must distinguish here 
between two types of pragmatists. those who viewed federalism as no 
more than a transitionary step on the path to unitary government, and 
those who saw federalism, much as Nkrumah alleged, as a disguised 
form of balkanization. 
In Nigeria, Soudan (now Mali), and Uganda, many leaders sought 
federalism mainly to ease the transition to unitary rule. They 
recognized that any attempt to impose a unitary system at the time of 
independence would result in grave instability, perhaps secession. 
Therefore they sought to reduce integration load factors by 
compromising on federalism. In doing so, they did not abandon their 
preference for unitary government. Uganda's Obote conceded a 
federal relationship to Buganda prior to independence largely to end 
the kingdom's secessionist claims; however, with a decline in Buganda 
unity and power, he strengthened the center's hegemony and, in 1966, 
successfully proposed a new constitution which abrogated Buganda's 
entrenched privileges and treated the country as a unitary state. 
On the other hand, when Soudanese leaders pressed for a unitary system 
"as perfectly logical, indeed historically dictated,"26 the Mali 
Federation disintegrated. And in Nigeria, a number of politicians 
linked most intimately with the federal system were to question the 
long-range desirability of this type of polity. "The time may come," 
declared federal Prime Minister Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 
"after understanding one another better, and without one tribe 
dominating the other, when we can hope for a unitary form of government, 
but not now."27 Federalism was seen as a response to Nigerian 
circumstances — in particular, the nature of Nigerian fears and the 
configuration of power within the state 28 — not a desired end in 
itself. It was considered preferable to disunity, but intrinsically 
a second-best.29 
Other African pragmatists looked upon federalism as a means of 
securing virtually complete subregional autonomy. Thus Katanga's^ 
Moise Tshombe, motivated as much by parochial political considerations 
within Katanga 30 as by the desire to minimize Katanga's fiscal 
contributions to the center, advocated a loose form of federalism in 
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the Congo. Federal government was not to be a transitionary stage 
on the way to unitary forms but a means of dispersing power on a long-
term basis — in Nkrumah's terms, balkanization in disguise. As 
early as December 1959, Tshombe outlined his party's position on the 
future Congo constitution. He called for the creation of "sovereign" 
states which would surrender "a determined part of their sovereignty 
to a Federal State."31° How much power were the states to surrender? 
Obviously very little, for Tshornbe specified that the competency of 
the central government "would be limited to questions of general 
interest to the Congo" and that central authorities would be pro-
hibited from intervening in "interior matters" or in economic affairs, 
"except within the limits of co-ordination at the national level." 32 
The trend of separatist thinking was thus already set which led 
ultimately to the Tananarive conference where a decentralized constit-
ution was considered by Congolese leaders and a subsequent demand bv 
Tshombe (in the negotiations on the Plan of National Reconciliation) 
for "a fully decentralized federation."33 As Prime Minister Cyril 
Adoula suggested, such an emphasis on separatism ran counter to the 
spirit of cooperation and coordination essential to true federalism. 
"If Mr. Tshombe really wants a federal regime," Adoula wrote, " he 
must accept all its consequences, including the renunciation of 
privileges in the division of foreign currency. To fix a definite 
percentage beforehand is out of the question."34 
In sum, Tshombe's conception of the role of federalism contrasted 
sharply with those of Obote, Keita, and Balewa; yet the overall effect 
of their views was similar. None of the pragmatists (to say nothing 
of the others) were committed to a lasting form of cooperative 
federalism, with the result that an ethos favorable to genuine 
federalism was lacking. As a consequence, the federal principle fail-
ed to secure crucial support from the key leaders of Africa — making 
its application in the decolonization era perilously difficult. 
The third test of the applicability of federalism, a climate of 
tolerance, points up the limits of political institutional transfer. 
Federalism is, after all, a system accruing from Western liberal 
values.35 Wrenched away from an environment that accepts the 
unquestioned worth of political pluralism, constitutionalism, legalism, 
and compromise, it tends to operate against an alien and inhospitable 
background. This alienation becomes more poignant when complicated 
by third world conditions of poverty, illiteracy, and ethnic separat-
ism. 
In fact, political life in the developing lands runs counter to 
the kind of environment conducive to stable federalism. Constitution-
alism and legalism at the modern state level are broadly accepted means 
of reconciling interests in the west. However Africans frequently 
look upon them with widespread indifference, seeing them as imports 
dangerous to their countries' modernization. Political pluralism 
is considered a virtue in many western countries, but in Africa, 
where a consensus on goals and values is often lacking, it is regarded 
as a further threat to order and development.36 
The political process during and after decolonization, high-
lighted by a remorseless struggle for power between local elites, 
complicates the emergence of conciliatory intergroup relations on a 
multidimensional basis. More often than not the parliamentary 
system hurriedly thrust upon African states by the departing colonial 
power is superseded by a single party or no-party presidential system 
which looks most critically at the kind of diffusion of responsibil-
ities implicit in federalism. This tendency is reinforced by the 
great demands implicit in modernisation which impose heavy burdens 
on federal government. In earlier times, when federal schemes were 
effected in the west, state systems were comparatively stable and 
citizens made minimal demands upon their governments; the present-day 
welfare state era, however, places enormous strains on federalism, 
both in the level of services required and in the nature and extent 
of state participation. The effect of this strain upon region-
building is noted by Ali A.Mazrui, who observes that 
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.-.socialism can be inherently parochial when it 
is concerned with national planning. For in the 
concept of planning the preoccupation of socialism 
is with the domestic needs of the individual country 
and with, the control of domestic factors of production. 
Therefore, as Tanzania has got more socialistic, it 
has had to become less Pan-African regionally. 
Impatient to be in full command of its home economy, 
it has progressively weakened the East African spirit.37 
The effect of these background conditions on federalism can be seen 
in the difficulties involved in creating and working federal relation-
ships. The new leaders, inspired by socialism and convinced that 
western-styled constitutionalism hampers the tasks of modernization, 
play down the values of western liberalism. This is not to 
criticize their assessment of their countries needs and priorities, 
but merely to point out that the effect of these assessments is to 
create a climate basically unhealthy for federalism. 
In addition, the tensions inherent in the political process 
also run counter to the evolution of elite complementarity. The 
demographic artificiality and newness of African states as well as 
the evoluti n of integral nationalism thwart the emergence of the kind 
of value framework in which tolerance and diversity flourish. 
Consequently, political conflicts are too fundamental in nature, 
with elections becoming something akin to "win all, lose all" battles 
between adversaries. It is because these conflicts are so basic 
and the stakes so high that single party or no-party control along 
centralized lines becomes an accepted feature of political life. 
The implications of this for federalism are enormous. Since 
the crucial actors on the political scene tend to be alike in the 
manner in which they chafe at institutional or interest group 
restraints as well as in their conception of politics as something 
approximating a "zero-sum" game,38 little flexibility is left for 
such essential requisites of federalism as compromise and tolerance. 
Senegalese fears of eclipse in a Mali Federation dominated by 
Modibo Keita and his militant, unitary-minded Union SoudanaiSe led 
to a hasty retreat from commitments no longer to their liking. 
Somewhat similar anxieties were evident in the discussions over the 
proposed East African federation, not only among the Baganda, the 
Arabs of Zanzibar, and the spokesmen for the moderately conservative 
Kenya African Democratic Union but, more significantly, among such 
principals as Prime Minister Obote of Uganda. Uganda's demand at 
the working party meetings for loose federal links was an outward 
expression of grave apprehensions. A comment on this state of mind 
was Kenya Minister of State Joseph Murumbi's statement at the 
height of the federation debate: 
I feel that in Uganda, we have this difficulty 
of the leadership there fearing they will be 
absorbed into an East African Federation. Some 
of the Uganda leaders feel they might become 
non-entities overnight.39 
The fear, as Adoko Nekyon expressed it, of being thrown into 
darkness 40 caused Ugandans to draw back from East African 
integration, unless unity were hedged about with sufficient 
restrictions to ensure broad freedom of action for the constituent 
parts. Obote and his cabinet colleagues recognized fully the 
centripetal tendencies in modern federalism as well as the "zero-
sum" gains situation of politics on much of the continent. Only 
conditions which involved considerably reduced load factors 
in particular a climate of tolerance and compromise — might have 
made a plunge into the unknown a decision of less magnitude, and 
it is these conditions which were largely lacking in the East 
Africa of 1963/64. 
A sense of community, the fourth requirement, has all too 
frequently been insufficient to the needs of federalism in Africa. 
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Precisely because there is nothing natural about most of Africa's 
multi-tribal or proposed multi-territorial states, the building of 
a sense of community is one of the main challenges that face Africa's 
new leadership. Nigeria's serious tribal.rioting of 1966 under-
scores the formidable obstacles to such an undertaking; this violence 
has led to the weakening of inter-unit economic and political links 
and the repatriation of many hundreds of thousands of people to 
their region of origin, emphasizing local nationalism at the expense 
of Nigerian nationalism.41 For reasons already discussed, the new 
African leadership prefers to create a sense of community by the most 
direct means at hand, with the consequence that it shies away from 
such reconciliational institutions as federalism out of a fear that 
concessions to parochialism will inhibit modernization.42 Under 
certain circumstances, the unitary, one party or no-party systems to 
which these leaders are attracted are able to foster elite linkage 
in tribally or regionally compartmentalized states; nevertheless the 
persistence of such differences in large socially pluralistic states 
like Nigeria makes some form of decentralized structural mechanism 
essential, although not necessarily along classical federal lines. 
The nature of inter-unit linkage points up the difficulties in 
the way of forging a sense of community. A combination of the 
colonial heritage and low levels of economic development has limited 
transactions between contiguous sovereign states in eastern and 
western Africa as well as between regions within such large countries 
as Nigeria and the Congo (Leopoldville). The effects of the colonial 
heritage, lack of coordinated planning and slow modernization, are 
evident in many wayss the arbitrary linguistic divisions, the 
existence of competing and poorly connected road and rail services, 
the inadequacy of telecommunications ties, and the special subsidy, 
tariff and commodity agreements between former metropolitan powers 
and their African associates. Also, because intersectoral flows 
between African regions are relatively small,43 the coordination of 
the continent's economic efforts is often accorded a lower priority 
than the maintenance of access into existing high-priced markets in 
Europe and North America.. 
Of course, where a strong sense of community preceded the 
establishment of common political institutions, the chances of these 
joint institutions surviving separatist pulls in an area of low 
social and economic exchange are enhanced. The importance of such 
a. sense of community is illustrated by the cases of Somalia and 
Cameroon, where irredentist sentiments proved sufficiently strong 
to unify peoples artificially separated by the chance factors of 
colonial occupation. But subsequent events elsewhere in Africa 
have underlined the great extent to which these acts of integration 
by impulse are special cases indeed. 
Finally, the fifth requirement, a myth of potential benefit, 
is inadequately satisfied in much of Africa. In assessing the 
benefits of wide territorial integration, leaders have been all too 
prone to concentrate, statically, upon the existing situation and 
to pay little heed to the potential for growth. Such an outlook 
is as paralyzing as it is one-sided. In addition, the nature of 
interest group activities in Africa, as compared to those in Europe, 
gives little impetus to federation. Whereas expectations of 
rising prosperity lead European interest groups to seek increased 
transnational coordination, their African counterparts often lack 
this myth of potential benefit 44 arising from wide geographical 
unification. In the industrial societies of Europe "supranational-
ity and a lively spillover process are able to flourish"45 because 
pluralism, free enterprise, and a. broad economic interdependence 
create a transnational framework within which the political actors 
must operate to a very great extent. By comparison, African 
politicians are much freer to determine whether or not to enter a 
federation, because interest groups are neither as powerful nor as 
transnationally oriented as in Europe. In this sense, Uganda's 
Obote has greater manoeuvreability than France's de Gaulle;46 the 
former can refrain more easily from committing his country to a 
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political federation if he concludes that the risks outweigh the 
anticipated rewards. And given the politician's full awareness of 
immediate problems and risks, he is tempted, in setting his priorities, 
to play down the significance of potential benefits. 
Since the federal compromise would seem to have limited utility 
under post-independence conditions in Africa, it logically follows 
that constitutional relations will generally have to avoid the 
reconciliational middle and move to either unitary government or 
loose inter-unit arrangements. In the case of unitary systems, 
the ruling elite's preference for such schemes is a response to its 
two essential challenges to successful administrations the mainten-
ance of national stability and unity and the achievement of 
modernization. Strong central leadership is viewed by civilian 
and military elites alike as a prerequisite for modernization. 
These men chafe impatiently at subregional limitations upon their 
authority and reject the conflicts and compromises of federalism 
as wasteful, disconcerting, and even corrupting. They seek order 
and symmetry, national integrity and rapid strides toward industrial-
ization. Quite naturally, then, concessions to tribal and ethnic 
autonomy are feared as divisive manoeuvres. And wherever the 
leaders of the independence period made expedient moves to include 
subregionalist guarantees in their constitutions in order to speed 
independence, the men in power of a few years later felt no com-
punction about breaking such colonialist-inspired safeguards in 
the name of higher responsibilities. 
The obverse of this drive for unitary forms is the fear of 
centralized power which these forms engender. In certain cases, 
anxieties on the part of traditional or territorial groups have 
led to the ultimate non-reconciliational extreme of demands for 
complete autonomy. But the dangers inhering in such demands were 
pointed out clearly by Chief Obafemi Awolowo shortly after his 
release from prison; "the breaking up of Nigeria into a number of 
sovereign states," he stated, "will not only do permanent damage to 
the reputation of contemporary Nigerian leaders, but will usher in 
terrible disasters which will bedevil us and many generations to 
come."47. Separatism is the "no-win" course of action for all 
parties involved in such constitutional disputes. 
However, many politicians who took cognizance of local fears 
of an overweening center sought compromise solutions between the 
extremes of unitary government and total separation. Thus the 
same Lt.-Colonel Yakuba Cowon who ruled out the breakup of Nigeria 
as "economically and politically suicidal,"48 also ruled out a 
unitary system as unrealistic under existing circumstances. "As a 
result of the recent -vent and the other previous similar ones," 
he declared in a nationwide broadcast upon assuming power, "I have 
come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely 
continue in this wise, as the basis for trust and confidence in our 
unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of 
time."49 
Realism, then, required a search for a compromise in the 
broad area between the extremes of strong centralization and full 
autonomy for constituent units. The extent of the central 
government's competence would depend upon a number of factors such 
as the level of inter-unit transactions, the tenacity of the will 
to union, the strength of parochial apprehensions, the closeness 
of elite linkage, and so forth. Supranational associations 
carried over from previous relationships, bringing with them a 
history of shar 
G Q GXjpC riences, albeit sometimes painful, may add an 
impetus to the setting up of more comprehensive and centralized 
constitutional arrangements. But the experience of the decade 
following decolonization makes one point quite evident? these 
constitutional arrangements must be designed, as far as is 
practicable, to conform to the basic configurations of power in 
the area or they are not likely to endure the test of time. To 
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miss this point' is to tempt grave instability, and perhaps the 
destruction of the state itself, 
At this juncture in history it is possible to analyze the logic 
behind the trend toward the extremes of unitary government and 
separatism as well as the reaction, in certain cases, away from these 
extremes and in the direction of various reconciliational compromises. 
But it is premature to draw any but the most general conclusi)ns on 
the nature of the reconciliational models which will be utilisable 
in modern Africa. As was indicated in the main body of this paper, 
classical federalism has thus far failed to provide a workable 
balancing mechanism between the competing claims of parochial and 
countrywide nationalism. Even in Nigeria, a land of great size and 
broad diversity of traditional groupings, the protections of federal-
ism proved unavailing. This incapacity to act as a guarantee of 
subregional interests was in no way lost on Africa's tribal or 
territorial leaders. They were genuine in their desire for 
national and international unity, but they were reluctant to pay the 
price that such unification seemed to entail. Thus while new 
experiments with classical federalism cannot be precluded especially 
in Nigeria, the growing awareness of its centripetal implications 
makes unlikely any large-scale return for the present to experiments 
with this constitutional form. 
But if classical federalism has limited utility, it follows 
that the urgent need for some type of interterritorial arrangement 
will have to be met largely by other reconciliational devices. Here 
it is necessary to point to the creative role that neo-federal 
arrangements are likely to play in the future. Neo-federalism, 
an archetype which applies to a wide gamut of supranational relation-
ships which may potentially develop into new forms of federalistic 
or genuine federal polities, is a useful category for the broad 
array of transnational institutions emerging in the world today, 
•/That Francois Perroux calls "the solidarity of the plurinational 
infrastructure"50 may be an apt way of describing modern man's 
answer to the challenge of modernization in an era of mini-national-
ism. Surely in today's Africa, to be innovative is only to be 
realistic. 
In neo-federalism, then, we find a creative attempt to 
preserve the essence of unity in the face of massive centrifugal 
pressures. In Africa, a number of inter-unit associations exemplify 
the present-day search for such innovative associations. The 
French-speaking states of west and equatorial Africa have worked out 
a number of interterritorial relationships which integrate the 
sovereign states in a limited way. The Afro-Malagasy Common 
Organization, successor to the Union Africaine et Malagache, has 
pursued common political and social as well as economic activities. 
At the 1966 Heads of State meeting in Tananarive, OCAM statesmen 
endorsed President Leopold Senghor's inter-African cultural 
activities and supported studies on the possibilities of a joint 
insurance company and planning conference. In the past, the OCAM 
has taken a strong political position on such questions as Ghanaian 
subversion, participation at the 1965 Accra summit conference, and 
accommodation with Tshombe's Congo republic. The Central African 
Economic and Customs Union has progressed slowly in the direction 
of common developmental policies and fiscal and customs arrangements; 
significantly, the beginning of construction on a joint oil refinery 
at Port Gentil, Gabon, was hailed by President Leon Mba as a 
"brilliant success. . . which may preview this African unity which 
we all desire."51 Perhaps most significant of all, the Council of 
the Entente has provided the foundation for economic, social and 
political cooperation. Although the Entente has no interterritorial 
institutions, it boasts considerable achievements in joint diplomatic 
representation, foreign policies, port facilities, railway links, 
and solidarity funds. The solidarity fund involves a valuable 
means of redistributing Ivory Coast wealth to the poorer members of 
the grouping.52 Senegalese Foreign Minister Doudou Thiam's 
appraisal of the Entente is interesting; 
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This is undeniably a flexible type of organization. 
It takes account of certain realities in present-day 
Africa, particularly national realities. But there 
are weaknesses too in the Conseil de 1'Entente. 
Notwithstanding the safeguards written in, certain 
states fear they may become satellites of the Ivory 
Coast. Moreover there are difficulties in the 
organization of common financial arrangements, 
notably the distribution of the Customs receipts, 
collected at the port of Abidjan, which belong 
jointly to several states.53 
Despite these difficulties, the leaders of the Entente states have 
spoken most hopefully regarding the future of their grouping. For 
example, the presidents of the Ivory Coast, Niger, and Upper Volta 
jointly declared after a meeting in Upper Volta in December 1964 that 
they envisaged "an eventual fusion of their three countries."54 
In English-speaking Africa the trend is much the same. Once 
the delegates to the working party on East African federation openly 
revealed the extent of their differences, a higher priority was placed 
upon strengthening the East African Common Services Organization than 
upon political federation as such.55 From this point onward, a 
search took place — and continues to take place — to find a firm 
flooring on which a supranational organization of limited competence 
could be established for the long term. The process of decentralizing 
some of the more politically sensitive fields of responsibility has 
been disheartening to the observer. In such areas as currency 
coordination, university development, military cooperation, the 
encouragement of interterritorial trade, industrial location, and 
joint initiatives in attracting tourism, movement has been in the 
direction of a weakening of links. The key question now is whether 
the momentum of disintegration can be stopped before running its full 
course. Can the non-essential be jettisoned and the ship of 
transnational union be saved with some of its cargo still intact? 
If this can be accomplished, the decentralizing process should be 
viewed as a creative,or at least a life-preserving, one.56 
It is too early to predict whether lasting neo-federal links 
can be forged in East Africa. Many East Africans have come to 
pessimistic conclusions, reasoning that the failure of all partners 
to ratify the Kampala agreement is a bad omen for the unity of the 
region. Thus Uganda's Shafiq Arain told the November 1966 meeting 
of the Central Legislative Assembly that "the Kampala agreement has 
been made sheer mockery." On the basis of this experience, he 
predicted "that if there was a way of dividing the Railways and the 
Post Office in East Africa we would be doing just that."57 
On the brighter side, how:ver, is the serious consideration 
East Africans are presently giving both to the Philip Commission's 
report on the future of the East African common market and common 
services and to the treaty of cooperation between the three countries. 
Success in these negotiations will be a victory for neo-federalism. 
Indications are that the draft treaty includes major proposals 
redefining the role and powers of the East African Central Legislative 
Assembly and the EACSO Secretariat, relocating a number of the 
constituent section of EACSO in Uganda and Tanzania, moving the EACSO 
Secretariat in whole or in part from Nairobi, decentralizing the 
University's activities, and setting out a new system of economic 
cooperation.58 Provided that agreement can be reached on some such 
cooperation and present uncertainty over the future of East African 
links can be ended, a quickening of commercial activities can be 
anticipated.59 
In the case of Nigeria, the constitutional picture is one of 
great unpredictability. At the September 1966 national conference 
on Nigeria's future constitution, Lt.-Colonel Gowon said he believed 
that the delegates should reject both a unitary system and complete 
separation. He then advanced four possibilities as practicable 
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courses of actions 
1. A federal system with a strong central government, 
2. A federal system with a weak central government, 
3. Confederation, 
4. An entirely new arrangement peculiar to Nigeria.60 
A combinati on of the latter two categories, envisaging new decentral-
ized constitutional structures, may well fit the broad description 
of neo-federalism. Particularly interesting from this standpoint 
is the fourth category, since such an African-inspired initiative 
could act as a precedent for other large African states seeking to 
harmonize similar deep-seated subregional differences. 
Although the All-Nigeria Constitutional Conference recommended 
that Nigeria retain its federal form of governmental Eastern leaders 
resisted a return to the former order. At the Lagos conference, 
Eastern spokesmen proposed that Nigeria should become a confederation 
of four largely autonomous regions. Eastern Nigeria's Military 
Governor, Lt.-Colonel Ojukwu, repeatedly denied any wish for secession; 
at the same time, however, he asserted that "the factors which make 
for a true federation do no longer exist."62 Anti-Ibo violence had 
led to a constitutional impasse. Eastern Nigerians spoke earnestly 
of seeking ways and means for ensuring the continued existence of 
the "giant of Africa," but their anxieties caused them to shun 
Lt.-Colonel Gowon's appeals to return to the October constitutional 
conference. Clearly, unless greater trust emerges at all levels, 
the sense of community and inter-reliance intrinsic to federalism 
will be lacking, making the adoption of such a constitutional 
system difficult indeed. In that event, a reduction in integration 
load factors will become a creative act, for a looser type of state-
form will seem essential to keep the country intact. 
In conclusion, the trend from federalism to neo-federalism in 
Africa is not an indication of failure, but a practical adjustment 
to the dynamic interplay of forces which were thrust to the surface 
at the time of independence. The proponents of neo-federalist 
arrangements may yet demonstrate the way to unity by effecting a 
lasting reconciliation between general and particular interests at a 
time when the nature of the political process in the third world 
makes old formulas suspect. Perhaps a widespread realization that 
integration tactics, even objectives, have shifted and that political 
federation is no longer deemed the immediate goal under all circum-
stances may lead to a healthy easing of tensions. Such a general 
relaxation might prove productive over the long pull, allowing men 
to build gradually upon an ever increasing functional interdependence. 
As Tanganyika's Governor G.S. Symes astutely observed following the 
failure of efforts in the 1930's to bring about political closer 
union s 
This Government is in complete accord with the 
recommendation of the /"Joint Select Committee 
on Closer Union in East Africa_7 that the 
several Governments should develop the maximum 
co-operation that can secure the public interest 
and promote efficient and economical management 
of the public services. In so far as Tanganyika 
is concerned the process of co-operation may 
prove to have been simplified by the decision 
that a political or constitutional union of the 
three Territories is no longer an imminent 
issue.63 
Paradoxically, then, the most effective federalists of the present 
era may well be those who shun the lures of the political kingdom. 
Such an approach may lack drama, but results are what matter most. 
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